be 1 Rion ballroom march 9, 2005 7:30 P.M. Dan senor >>> Excuse my lack of height up here, but good evening. Welcome to the second official program for Jewish awareness month. My name is Rachel Matthew. I am the chairperson of this program. I want to tell you a little bit about what Jewish awareness month is going to be this year. . what I really think is many times people look at a religion. It's too in-depth and complex. I'd rather not get into it. 2 I don't want to teach you everything about Judd JuDAiSm, but give you a window and view of a culture that's complex and also beautiful I hope you have a lot of fun and really enjoy yourselves and hope you walk away with a little more knowledge and hopefully, a lot more understanding. We have some great programs coming up. There are programs that will break down stereotypes, such as nice Jewish girls gone bad. A lot of fun. I really highly endorse that We also have fun programs where you can come and meet Jewish students and non-jewish students 3 such as bowling, tomorrow night at the REitZ. Everyone is welcome. Rock-climbing events and tons of programs. Please, there are calendars all over your chairs. Please take one, put it on your fridge at home, share it with your roommates. I have to see all of you at these programs. They are really great and really fun and really, really informative. Right now, I would like to introduce David Buchalter, the chairperson for accent, a fabulous guy, and he will introduce our speaker. I hope you all enjoy our night. Thank you very much. >> how are you doing this 4 evening? >> Yeah! Sparking debate and expanding the minds from accent has prompted controversial speakers at the University of Florida for 40 years. Speakers this past semester, the great pornography debate, Janet Reno. And accent has joined up with women's history month Liz Murray, who at 15 brought herself out of poverty and graduated in two years and her entire life is told from home loss to Harvard. Liz has been featured on Oprah and "People" magazine. She will be speaking at 7:30 P.M. on Wednesday 5 march 16th at the Phillips center. As always, accent shows are free and open to the public. Accent is a student organization fueled by student support and we'd love to hear your comments and thoughts about tonight's presentation. Please lead feedback on tonight's presentation at Www.sg.ufl.edu/accent. or on your way out, stop by our feedback table and fill out a survey. Any person that fills out a survey will be entered into a chance for a Ralph for tonight's speaker. I'd like to thank the president of the student Jewish union who already came in and the Jewish 6 awareness month director Rachel Matthew for all their hard work on tonight's presentation. My staff this entire year has been spectacular as we round out this spring semester and my last semester at the university. Please note all your hard work is paying off and all your strong work paying off more than ever. Thaw for your dedicated work to this university. This evening, accent is delighted to host Dan senore as senior ambassador for Paul Bremer. Senior advisor to presidential envoy Paul Bremer. As an accomplished speaker, he gave more than 100 press speakings during the war 7 zone. He studied at the university of western Ontario and Hebrew university in Jerusalem and hold an MBA at Harvard business school. Recently during the Ukrainian elections he was an election observer. Two weeks ago, he returned from the states, Iraq, united Arab Emirates, Qatar and currently a fox news analyst. He will talk about his experience is in Iraq and the Jewish experience in Iraq and the broader war on terror. He's happy to answer questions following the speech. Without further adieu, accent speakers from the 8 University of Florida proudly present Dan senor. >> Thank you. Thank you. Can y'all hear me? Thank you, David, for the production and thank you, Rachel for the introduction of the introduction. Thank you all for being here. A special thanks to accent and the Jewish student union for playing a part, basically taking the lead role in organizing this event, Jewish awareness month, which from my understanding, is an important event here on campus, something I certainly re late to, given my own ground and my own commitments. I understand last year's 9 Jewish awareness month speaker, kickoff speaker was Dr. Ruth. My talk will not be nearly as colorful but I hope you will stay nonetheless. I returned from Iraq, I returned a couple of weeks ago. It was my first time back there. in about eight months I returned from my first tour in the summer of '0 3 and there for 15 months, as David said. Since I've been back, both from the first trip and this trip, I've basically been travelling around the country of the United States, talking to folks about what's going on in Iraq, providing to provide some on the ground reality, 10 some pictures, some first hand testimony of the testimonials on the good, the bad and ugly, of which there is much an abundance of all three that's going on there and trying to provide balance in the discussion. I've also been trying to re connect with family and friends. When I was over in Iraq I lost touch, as is understandable with a lot of family and friends because I was working seven days a week, 20 hours a day in a very intense environment under transcutaneous pressure. It was easy to lose touch with folks. For instance, it was last summer I saw my mother for 11 the first time after being gone for 15 months. I saw her at a family re union in Cleveland. It's not to say I didn't hear from ply mother when I was over in Iraq. Due to the miracles of modern technology I actually heard from her quite frequently Some of you will appreciate this, particularly those who have Jewish mothers. As luck would have it, I had a cell phone capability there. I would hold a press conference everyday at about 5:00 p.m. Baghdad time. An eight hour time difference. The White House had us time the press conferences so it 12 would be 9: 00 a.m. in the U.S. The idea is our press conferences begin just as the morning shows at the U.S. were coming to a close and the cable networks would care our press conferences light general mark Kimmitt, the brigadier general, the military spokesman alongside me, who worked on doing the daily press briefings. So, we would hold our press conference at 5 P.M., 9 A.M. eastern standard time, and as we'd walk off the podium from time-to-time, literally step off the podium, cameras still rolling, being broadcast live on CNN or fox whatever, my phone would ring. 13 General Kimmitt was always convinced this was a crisis, the situation room was calling from the White House. there we were walking off the podium, it must have been something he just said caused some her international crisis. And they were calling us to get us to rectify, correct some statement. The phone would ring and we'd panic and I'd answer it, there would be a pause and he'd hear me say, hi, mom. And she would, of course, give me what's could instant mom feedback on how I did in the press conference. He would then of course, overhear these discussion 14 as the cameras were rolling. Saying things like, no, mom, I am getting enough sleep, yes, I am eating, mom. She would watch these broadcast back. now she gives me feedback in realtime. There's a cell phone ringing right here. My immediate reaction when I'm behind a podium and hear a phone ringing, it's her. In any event, what I thought I would do tonight is give you a sense of what I think is going on in Iraq right now, provide you some perspective from the ground and talk about what it means for the region, directionally what it means 15 for our country, for certainly the next few years, where Iraq will take our foreign policy and our foreign policy will take Iraq, as it impacts, the Arab/Israel conflict, situation with Lebanon and Syria and broader issues outside the Middle East I think are being affected and are affecting the situation on the ground. Then, of course, after my talk, I'm happy to take questions and hear comments and alternative speeches , whichever direction you're so inclined. To give you a sense what's going on in Iraq, it's important -- -recently we've had a lot of good news in Iraq. I think that's great. 16 We'll talk about that. I think it's important to look at the good news in Iraq and the bad news in Iraq, of which unfortunate they there was a lot of that, too, from time-to-time. Look at it in the context of the challenges. In other words, people here don't -- back home, I've been struck by this since I've been back, people don't -- they react to the news without a sense of bigger picture, without a sense of context, without a sense of the challenges. What are the challenges. I preface my remarks by saying I'm not going to get into e the politics in Iraq unless you're interested in drawing that out of me in 17 the Q&A but I will give you a sense There are a few fundamental challenges we face and will face going forward. The first challenge I don't think is enough attention here. Everyone focuses on the physical state of infrastructure. On any given day you'll see an articles in the "New York Times" about the state of electrical structure in Iraq and physical infrastructure. The physical infrastructure is important but not nearly as important as the psychological infrastructure of the Iraqui greatest challenges, the state of the psychological situation, 18 the Iraqui people's peacefulness with themselves, peacefulness with one another, peacefulness with us, em men aits largely -- em men aits largely and problematically from coming from three decades of total TAliRiSm and you don't snap out of that. It will take them a long time to come to piece with one another and come to piece and reconciliation as south Africans did and following aapartheid. That takes time and poses a challenge for Iraq and the Middle East. A couple of examples. I drove up from Kuwait to Baghdad on April 20th, a 12 hour drive, the first civilian convoy into Iraq. 19 We established our headquarters at one of Saddam's palaces, a bizarre experience I'm happy to talk about in the Q&A. We lived and worked there. A few days after aarrived in bad we drove down to AhillA, where one of the mass Graves had been discovered, about 50. the latest count I saw was about 50 across the country These were situations Saddam security forces would go into town, scoop up a large number of men execute them, shoot them in the back of the head and bury them and some cases bury them alive. There were hills and in ahillah, literally thousands, 3500 estimated people buried there. 20 These communities would not want to after the executions occurred in the last 10, 15 years, they would not want to go looking around for the mass Graves. The families new it was somewhere around but they didn't want to 2 looking for it. They didn't want to give the impression to the regime they were agitated, not want to give the impression they were looking for trouble. They minded their own business. After the fall of the regime on April 9th, all these communities went out looking and digging in fields, looking for their loved ones. 21 I showed up in ahillah, five days after this one masquerade had been discovered and you literally had thousands of people there digging. In fact the mayor secured a crane and they brought a crane in to dig up the field. It was scorching hot day and all I saw when I arrived were rows and rows of bones, skeletal remains of these people's loved ones. They were looking for ways to identify bones. This was buried shortly after the first Gulf War, '91 and '92. All there was left were bones. I remember seeing this woman holding up a bone, a 22 spine, and saying, this is my son. And I asked her, how do you know And she said, this shirt, which was dangling, which was dangling on the spine, he was wearing the day he disappeared over ten years ago. She quickly took the bones and with her sisters actually had an imprompt tu memorial, like the funeral that never happened they were never able to have for him as a service for him. I met another gentleman, held up a skull, I have a picture of this, held up a skull and told me this was his brother. When I asked him how he knew, he show med the ID card hanging from his bones 23 when he dug it up. He scratched off the dust, the dirt from the ID card, his brother's photo. This was going on all over this field, people scooping up bones and figuring out ways to identify their loved ones and holding impromptu services. Everywhere you went, the sounds were people screaming and crying. The human rights watches mates there are 300, 000 rehabilitation with buried in mass graves. 300, 000. They estimate 300, 000 missing or dead during Saddam's range somewhere between 300 million and 1.2 million missing over a decade. If you do the math 24 proportionate to a 27 million population, which is Iraq's population, compare it to the size of the U.S. population, it would be the equivalent of 13 to 14 million Americans missing per day. 13 to 14 million Americans missing or dead. That this is proportional impact this has had on Iraqui society. I think that's important when you reference something like September 11th. 3, 000 Americans dead in one day. Yet I feel as I'm sure many of you do, every one of us knows someone who died on September 11th or knows someone who knows someone. Everyone has a September 25 11th, someone who was killed or didn't show up for work that day or family member. That's just when 3, 000 family members were killed. Imagine 13 to 14 million Americans missing or dead and that broad sweep by government. Everyone in this room would know someone who was missing or dead. Which was exactly what Saddam's strategy was. He didn't discriminate. Everybody in the country was effective. The idea was make sure every single family in the country was somehow affected by his Tierney. I know -- every male I know. I can't think of one male 26 Iraqui adult that I got to know in Iran had not at one point been in a jail, torture chamber, been abused in some way, every single person I know, which was the strategy. If you touch every family, every family's terrified, and then is intimidated from protesting the regime or trying to overthrow it It was sadly, very successful strategy. It took over three decades for the regime to be overthrown. When it was, it was by foreign occupiers, not theory. which I think adds to their sense of humiliation they're aware how terrible life was for them and many would tell me how 27 embarrassed they were, that it took us to get rid of Saddam. They never could take matters into their own hands. To give you another antedote. I remember after Saddam was captured, ambassador Bremer and I were having din we are a group of Iraqui political leaders at a hotel in Baghdad near where we were working inside the green zone. Sitting on the other side of us were two women, Iraqui political leaders serving on the Iraqui political counsel. What was your family's reaction when you found out Saddam was captured? >> One woman said, 28 Mr. ambassador, the first thing I did, I gathered my children together and told them about their uncle for the first time. >> What do you mean? >> She said, well, my brother, when he was younger, agitated against Saddam as part of a protest, and he was -- Saddam was covering up the domestic intelligence agency, secret police, showed up and took her brother away and never saw him again. A couple weeks later they received a phone call saying her brother had been executed and the family was to come pick up his body. when they went to the government building to pick up his body, this was a 29 typical custom of the regime, they would not release the body to the family until the family paid for the bullet in his head to add to the sense of humiliation. They released his body, quietly buried him. never had a funeral for him. Then she grew up, this woman and started her own family, had children, never told her children about their dead uncle, deceased uncle because she was afraid if they were aware of it and they started talking about it and started telling their friends about it, word would get out they were agitated against the regime and complaining and they 30 were concerned the same fate would befall them. They just kept it quiet She said the first thing she did when Saddam was captured was tell the children about their uncle. Another woman to our left said the first thing she did was call her brother in Sweden, to let him know Saddam had been captured. When I asked her, what's your brother doing in Sweden? She said he's been getting medical treatment there for a number of years. It turns out when he was in high school, he one day in class made a disparaging comment about Saddam or one of his sons in a solely in pursuit of humor, he was not looking for trouble. 31 The teacher reported this to the principal of the school, the principal reported it to the ministry of education, the ministry reported it to the requisite security forces. The next day, a couple of security officials showed up at the school, pulled her brother out of class, and pulled all the students out of the class to stand around and watch as they proceeded to pour acid all over his face and body. He had been in Sweden, in Europe ever since he got out of the country, getting medical treatment. I tell you this not for effect, to give you a sense of what we're up against and Iraqui people are up against, you don't get rid 32 of that kind of horror, dreadful Tierney overnight. I'm the son of a holocaust survivor, I will tell you my mother and her siblings, my mother, less so, but certainly her siblings, something they will live for the rest of their life and a sister in 70s and something they walk with everyday, those horrors. You can imagine what life was like for the people in Iraq, coming out of three decades of it. Three decades to give you a sense of perspective here. Next challenge, is the Iraqui people went from night to day in the historic blink of an eye, three decades of toe total AlARiSm. We look at other case 33 studies talking about re construction to try to get a sense of what models work in Germany, Japan. what models worked in this re covers economies in the former Soviet Union. We could never find one that quite fit. If you take Germany and the third right and Hitler's reign were tragic and historically their own. We often forget Hitler was only in power for just about 12 years. About a third of the time the Baathists were in power in Iraq. Just 12 years. It was a terrible 12 years but after the fall of Hitler's regime, when Germans were picking up the pieces and trying to re 34 build their country, at least they could scratch their memories and have some sense to life under the YmAR re public that was in existence before, free speech. While it wasn't a public democracy, it certainly wasn't the third right. Germans had a sense of perspective. Because Hitler was in power for so short a period of time. Rakes lived under Saddam for three decades, almost three times as long as Hitler was in power. When you consider how young the Iraqui population is. Amazing, 60% is under 25 years old. For the vast majority of Iraqis, their only 35 knowledge of life is under Saddam. So you suddenly tell them, go from Saddam to total freedom, they don't know what that means, have no reference ., no experience under anything else. Getting used to that is not going to happen overnight. The other model we would look at is the former Soviet Union. Again, some parallels in trying to reconstruct and resuscitate a totalitarian command economy. On the other hand, we forget people living under the former Soviet Union had not perfect democracy, but they had some experience under Gorbachev with experimenting with the free press and experimenting 36 with the beginnings of a lib beralized economy. By the time the Soviet Union came crashing down it wasn't brand-new to them. They had begun to spearnsd learn what life was like under a different environment none of which occurred in Iraq. So that poses a challenge in and of itself. This is all brand-new to Iraq. The third example, I think is the most glaring, to those of you back here watching it on television this is security situation. And I don't want to sound poly anish, the security situation is real. And an enormous problem. I think it's one that's ultimately surmountable but 37 not without a lot of work and a lot more sacrifice. Security unfortunately, the security situation basically emanates from two problems. One, two factors. One, is the Iraqui threat, the insurgency which represents a minuscule percentage of the population, but they are effective. they have been killing a lot of people. Who are these people and where do they come from? they're mostly members of Saddam's 0 former regime who want the country to return to some version of Saddam. They're not happy with the way things are going, so they're doing everything 38 they can to thwart it. Any progress being made. Many of them served in Saddam's military. If you remember during the war, the third infantry division traveled north from Kuwait up to Baghdad. They were supposed to move past north of Baghdad into northwest of Baghdad, which is what we call the sunny triangle. Fallujah, you often hear about. Which this is headquarters, nexus of Saddam's power center, where a lot of security services were. They were supposed to move there. By the time they got to Baghdad on April 9th or a couple of days before, Baghdad terrorist 39 differently fell and the regime fell. They stopped and didn't keep moving north or nest. The fourth infantry division was supposed to come south from turkey. It never did, because we never worked out an arrangement with turkey for our troops to come down. So, the fourth infantry division never came down and engaged that part of the country Youked a this port of the country, called the Sunni triangle and never engaged by the third infantry division nor the fourth. In that area never touched were two entire divisions of the special Saddam special roup guard. They went home and laid low 40 to fight another day. They are largely behind the insurgency today, members of that group. The other threat comes from the foreign fighters, professionals, affiliates of talked. People like Abu Musab al Zarqawi you hear in the news. Who has been quite clear in his goal. He articulated it in a memo we obtained through our intelligence services, which I can talk about because the document was declassified while we were in Iraq, a document Zarqawi was sending to the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, not exactly sure where and outlined his battle plan for Iraq. 41 He was quite clear. He said there's no greater threat to the slamist terrorists than the establishment of a self-governing Iraqui democracy. He says in his memo and I quote if the Iraqis are successful in building a democracy, we the terrorists have to pick up and go fight somewhere else. We have to do everything we want to prevent this from happening. Part of the strategy was preventing the establishment of democracy in Iraq. The other goal was to inflame the country to civil war. His strategy, which he 42 begun to execute and has been for over a year, was to engage in the attacks against the Shia in the south. When ever you see a major terrorist attack in Iraq, about a week and a half ago in Al Hillah, over 100 Iraqis killed, those are Shia Muslims basically targeted by Zarqawi and his allies. The goal to engage in masstive attack against the Shia in the hope the Shia will go into the Sunni towns to seek reprises als and they'll seek revenge and then you have the makings of a civil war and inflame the country into domestic civil armed conflict. This is partly a strategy, 43 hoping to do the same thing and launching the attacks and occurs, he talks about. Fortunately despite his repeated attempts, the Shia have never sellout revenge. One of their religious leaders, Ayatollah Sistani has strongly discouraged the Shia from seeking revenge and encouraged them to channel their energy into the political process and talked to them about not pursuing a violent path and he's been quite successful. Despite these brutal and horrific and large attacks, the Shia not basically sellout revenge. In that regard, Zarqawi has not been successful and though he's killed a large number of people which is 44 dreadful and I think will continue for some time. >> I laid out for you the challenges. I hope it doesn't sound like I'm a pessimist here, I'm not. I actually remain cautiously optimistic about what's going on in Iraq. I'll begin to close off here by sharing with you why. At the tail end of my tour in Iraq, the first Tim time around, I went to the town of Al Hillah, which this is town I had been at at the front end of my trip, where the mass graves where. I went there 15 months later, June 27th, the day before the hand-over of sovereignty. I went with some reporters. 45 We visited a memorial to that mass grave we had been at a year before and we visited with some women who had lost loves ones. They showed us pictures of lost loved ones at the mass grave. We also visited something that day that didn't exist the first time we had been there. That was the democracy training center. Imagine that. Democracy training center in the heart of the Arab world. No such thing, one would think. It was launched by a Shia Islamic cleric, by the name of shake KuZAni, a very fascinating and inspiring guy. 46 He believed strongly in democracy and does not think Islam and democracy cannot co-exist. he fought funding from the coalition divisional authority to build a democracy training center and we did and he has since built it. We took a tour of it. State-of-the-art facility. you walk in and hear women with the BiAS on, Islamic religious dress sitting at computers doing research on the internet. There was no internet under Saddam. there were rooms where there were seminars going on, to train young Iraqis in political activandalism. basic things y'all are familiar with, how to 47 organize a letter to the editor writing campaign. You all are involved with various activists causes, I know the pro-israel groups on campuses certainly are. We take this to be granted. In that part of the world there was no letter to the editor. You doesn't write a letter to the newspaper and complain about the government. There's no editor, no newspaper. In Iraq, all there were was state controlled newspapers. Since the fall of the regime, 200 newspapers popped up, independent newspapers, some national newspapers with large circulations, some small 48 mom and pop shops with small circulation. The fact is you drive around Baghdad, people are standing there with kiosks and newspapers and arguing and debating about issues. Go into tea shops and they're debating about editorials. We healed a presses of and delivered was a -- we held a press conference and everyday there was a burgeoning Iraqui press consider. You want to watch a revolutionary change, watch a covered Iraqui women drilling a politician at the podium under the bright lights and cameras of pan air television broadcasting this over the region. None of this occurred. 49 At this democracy training center in Al Hillah, these young people were learning how to protest their government, how to participate in the upcoming elections, which at that time we knew would be a few months away, how to campaign, how to participate in a press conference. These seminars going on all over the building. One room was really unbelievable. You walked in, there were stacks and stacks of books. There were Iraqis, about 15 to 20 Iraqis sitting at computers, translating the books, they were English books, English to Arabic. I looked closely at the books. 50 They were classical texts on constitutional democracy. John stu wart mills, the federal list papers, books you all are quite familiar with from you poly-SCi 1 0 1 classes. He told us you can't build a democracy unless you have the intellectual capital that serves as debate on checks and balances about fed himself and how to build a democracy. -- about federalism. They were building the first texts on Iraqui democracy and translating all these books from English to Arab. I thought this situation in Iraq is certainly messy and complicated. You have people here who 51 are clearly committed to trying to make it work. Despite the violence, despite the intimidation, despite the horrific images, you are familiar with. You have people trying to turn conventional wisdom on its head and build a democracy. And I believed at the time this could work. I thought one potentially enormous factor was the pan air media. if you look at the structure of the media in the Arab world, you hear about Al Jazeera, it's provocative, inflammatory, anti-israel. One small thing in defense of Al Jazeera, they do broadcast the news across 52 the region. our press conference they broadcast it live everyday throughout the Arab world. I hated what their commentator said before the press conference about me and after the press conference about me. I loved for an hour straight everyday they broadcast Arab reporters asking really tough questions of me and not having to worry about getting killed when they walked out of the door. it was broadcast throughout the Arab world. AlRiBiA which does the same thing, broadcast throughout the regions. What does that mean? They're having a political process, having press 53 conferences, debating the issues, governments being held to accountability, the birth to Iraq's democracy occurring. not only was Iraq going to be audience to it, the whole Arab world was audience to it. If you're an Iraqui politician, you want to communicate with the Iraqui people you have to do it on satellite TV and take out ads on the TV. That's where they get news. Satellite dishes were banned under Saddam. Now, virtually every home in Iraq has a satellite dish, the hottest commodity in Iraq. Downtown streets in Baghdad are lined with satellite dish shops. 54 We used to fly over Baghdad in a Blackhawk helicopter. Almost every home had a satellite dish. When I got there, I remember satellite dishes were 400 dollars a dish on the streets. Six months through my tour there, they're sold about 200 dollars a dish. by the time I left I took one trip to downtown Baghdad, one final look, about 1 20 dollars a dish. What does that tell me? They flooded the market. They were being sold for dirt cheap at that point. If you're an Iraqui politician and want to get news out to Iraqis, you have to do it over satellite TV. Fortunately, this is 55 broadcast throughout the region. If you're a young Syrian in Damascus, young Lebanese, activist civilian in Beirut, young Iranian in Tehran, young Saudi in Riyadh, young Kuwait, young Egyptian, you're watching all this play out in Iraq. At some ., you're going to start to say to yourself, why not me? Why can't I do this? why can't I ask the tough questions about my government? Why can't I hold my government accountable? Why can't I go to some press conference and ask our leaders tough questions. why can't I go to the ballot booth and pull the 56 lever to change my government? >> You look at what's going on in the Arab world today, you try and rec style September 11th and try and get a sense what's going on and how these things habe happen. I'll tell you, I'm sad to admit this, I'm not surprised after spending a lot of time in the region, things like September 11th happened, they happened for many reasons. The ones most powerful, most people in the Arab world are living in high rates of poverty, ill literacy, political repression, humiliation, they have dreadful socioeconomic conditions and they're angry, 57 understandably. The problem is, unlike us when we're angry, we can change our government. They can't. They can't speak out against their government and hold anybody accountable. all they're told to do by their government and when they go to the mass is to change their hatred towards America or Israel. Americans are designed to be responsible for the dreadful life you live under. If you're a young Arab living in these countries and you want to say, no, I want to hold you, Mr. Prime minister, responsible, Mr. President for the fact I don't have a job or 58 electricity. Or I don't have food on my table, you can't. You'll be killed if you try to protest. this negative energy is channeled towards hatred towards us. Sometimes it manifests itself in really ugly ways. The epitome, of course, maximum version is what we experienced on September 11th. You have got to change the equation in that part of the world. You have got to change that relationship between citizens in that part of the world and the government. Right now, it's a disaster. and the train has already wrecked. 59 Until we stimulate democratic reform and forcing governments to let their citizens be held accountable, we can engage in all the military initiatives we want, we can try to solve all these problems military. Until we have a long-term political solution, we will not have a long-term anti-terrorism and root causes of terrorism. Try to build a democracy and stimulate democratic reform, trying to empower people to hold their governments accountable is so fundamentally critical. As you see what's going on in the region, I don't want to overstate what's going on, I don't want to hype what's going on but I do 60 want to take note of what's going on. The fact remains, there's no question that the Iraqui election, 8.8 million people went to the polls, defied the insurgents, Zarqawi warned the Iraqui people, you vote, you die. And the Iraq people flipped them, flipped Zarqawi the purple finger. They said, thanks, and we're going to go vote anyways. That was broadcast throughout the Arab world. So Al Aribiya carried this, one of the satellite channels have reporters in six cities from north to south in Iraq, polling places going live, watching women line up, despite the threat and go sweet vote 61 defy the terrorists. You talk to Iraqis. I was there and they said we are partly responsible for the Lebanese reaction, Lebanese protests and storming the streets and taking this matter into their own hands and demanding an end to the Syrian occupation. We can get into that in Q&A what is going on there. Clear they the broadcast of what was going on in Iraq was having and impact and I think impacted the Palestinian/Israel conflict. While the road ahead is messy and come a kid and the road ahead is violent. I believe what we're doing is truly important because of the tough days and 62 mistakes been made because anybody who argues otherwise has to explain what. how do you change that equation, the relationship between people in that part of the world and their governments. It's headed for a train wreck, it hasn't already been heading for a train wreck, the train wreck has already occurred. It's no longer stainable to turn a blind eye to that part of the world an hope the problem will go away and people's anger won't manifest itself in violence towards us. Thanks for listening. [ Applause ] 63 >> I'm happy to, as I said, take questions. >> >> in the past couple of weeks we've seen stories on the news regarding the Iraqis being against Friday and Saturday as their weekend. because of the Jewish Sabbath. What are your comments on that and also how do you feel that this new democracy in Iraq -- what will their relationship be with Israel? >> the first part I haven't seen that story. That's an issue for Iraqis to work route I would bet they are secular Iraqis who are making that ., if anybody 64 is, because for the religious Muslims, Fridays is Islamic holy day Not just Iraq, a holy day throughout the region. So, I don't -- I don't see how they can get around that. The Friday is the day all the Iraqis and Saudis and Kuwaitis and Egyptians that are religious go to mass. On the second thing, relationship with Israel, very interesting. something I was very cognizant of when I was there, my recent trip testing the waters, I was leaving from Baghdad international airport, travelling from Baghdad to Amann. From Amann, I was flying to Tel Aviv. 65 I was flying on the royal Jordanian all the way through. The Iraqui official who worked for royal Jordanian airlines at the Baghdad airport said Mr. Senor, where are you fly going through to? >> Dealing with check meg in. >> I said, I'm flying all the way to Israel. He didn't flinch. His biggest enter concern was how to tag my bags to get them to the airport. It didn't bother them, in the part of a world if you have an Israel stamp on your passport, you're not allowed in the country, forget about getting out, you're not allowed in. He didn't miss a beat. 66 When I was at the airport and flying out of Baghdad, I was with a minister, of the Iraqui government, a Sunni Arab, who I got to know when I was there. He asked me, where are you going? You going to Amann? The final destination was Amann. I said, my final destination is Israel. He didn't miss a beat. What I learned it's not that Iraqis are signing up to be ApAC members. They don't care. Fine, great, I don't want them to care. They're agnostic. they're not pro Israel, anti-israel. they're pro Iraq, busy with Iraq. 67 They want to know their job situation, electricity, security, Israel is the furtherest thing from their minds. Unlike most of these state controlled regimes, throughout the region, they need Israel in those regimes. They need to justify internal repression in their own country. They need to justify why they stain power for decades. The way they justify, like all do throughout history, on an external threat. We have an external threat trying to destroy us. That's why we have to live under this closed society and that's why there has to be oppression to deal with 68 traitors and why you have to deal with these dreadful conditions because we're at war. They justify eternal repression by blaming the situation on the external threat. Once you have a free society and people can challenge that and say what external threat? Is Israel really causing a problem for us? Is Israel really the reason we don't have electricity and jobs? if you have a free society, then challenges that and protests that, that line of argument will never pass the straight face test. No government will try to push it if they have an open media that can freely 69 challenge it It never stands up to the facts that's exactly what you have in Iraq right now No Iraqui politician would seek to blame anything in Israel on Israel because no Iraqui would buy it. This is not say they're Zionists. They could hate Israel. They just don't care, they're preoccupied with their own lives. I think it's and important lesson for us, that when you have societies in that part of the world left to their own devices where there's a free exchange of information, they make their own decision to let Israel worry about their own lives. One other . in this most 70 recent Iraqui election, not one political party that ran on a traditional pan air nas r right agenda, a lot of political parties are built on the pan air anti-israel agenda, not one political party that ran that agenda got elected. >> okay So Iraqis come across a lot of opposition. As an advisor, I'm curious, when you see things line 9/11 and you hear Michael Moore and you hear these very liberal sometimes just moderate groups going up against something that you obviously feel so deeply for, what-how do you react and what do you say to those groups? 9/11 is on Fahrenheit 9/11 71 is very skewed, no one debates that. He does make some good arguments. How do you rectify. >> sure. he makes some arguments. Some are obscene. In Fahrenheit 9 11 was the children playing on the merry-go-round, life in Iraq pro Saddam. I'd love to show that to the Iraqis. Show that to those with the missing families and show that to those who lived under the chemical attack in morning Iraq. Completely disconnected from reality. I don't take him seriously Michael Moore I do take seriously people opposed to the war. 72 I respect that. I understand the e frustration with the debate over weapons of mass destruction. Of course it's a legitimate frustration to have. One of the predicates, one of the key points in the case for war was weapons of mass destruction. Our intelligence agency, every intelligence agency in the western world believed he had weapons of mass destruction. We were wrong. People should be outraged That is totally understandable. One of the other reasons for going to war was what I talked about, which was trying to change that dynamic in the region, 73 trying to stop ignoring that part of the world. Hoping to just get stability by letting these dictators run wild without ever confronting them. That rationale, I think, is actually -- I actually think we'll start to see the fruits of the effort we took to go to war. But, look, if people have a disagreement over either one, WMD I respect and I ask people to explain, present with the information that this administration was presented with, that prime minister Blair was presented with, that the rest of the world was presented with, you're presented with this intelligence, what do you 74 do? That's the question peopleA mows the war need to answer. The other question -- people oppose the war need to answer. The other is if you oppose what we're doing now, explain what your solution is. Turning a blind eye to that part of the world doesn't work. We thought turning a blind eye would get us stability. And it got us the opposite of stability. The worst of which we experienced on September 11th. Turning a blind eye to that part of the world is no long ear solution. We need to engage it, 75 stimulate it for that form of the world and allow citizens in that part of the world to hold their leaders accountable. If you don't agree with that what's your solution? it's very easy to criticize what we did. I'm critical of certain things we did. I'm the first to appreciate that. It's irresponsible to criticize without saying, how would you handle this? People just say just ignore it, just don't deal with it. Is a non-solution, a non-factor. It will have zero positive impact going forward. It will make a bad security situation even worse. 76 So, how I handle that question is, I respect your disagreement, I understand your frustration, what would you do? >> yes. There's been a lot of highly publicized incidents most weekly the time journals people killed at military checkpoints. I wonder do you have any thoughts about why that seems to be such a problem and what can be done to make it safer and easier for our soldiers and people there at the checkpoint to keep theirselves safe. >> something I experienced all the time and I was just there. I guess frustrated and have to consider the following. 77 About two months ago an Iraqui -- we think it was an Iraqui snuck on to a military base in Mosul and blew himself up in the chow hall in the cafeteria and killed 22 Americans. Every American soldier that is at a checkpoint, every American soldier guarding a base is well aware that that happened, understandably doesn't want that to happen on their watch. They're in a war. It is a very tense situation. These soldiers are very wary. from time-to-time tragically mistakes happen, they misread a situation and they fire. I don't want to start 78 attributing blame or getting into that debate. It's hard for me to blame these troops give then fog of war, a very tense situation. None of them wants to be the one that lets someone sneak through, so they're on edge. I don't envy their situation. I will say at checkpoints outside of military basis, there are checkpoints throughout Baghdad. on this most recent trip which I didn't see on my first trip, on military bases, on checkpoints throughout the country, there are now Iraqis manning those checkpoints. if you're an Iraqui and going through the 79 checkpoint, you're stopped, it's a fellow Iraqui citizen in uniform who asks you for your ID. When I was there a year ago, it was American soldier doings that which was bad, bad symbolically, bad psychologically, humiliating for an Iraqui to be interrogated terrorist differently ats the checkpoints by a foreign uniform. Now, they're dealing with their fellow American citizens in uniform and I think that is having a positive terrorist. >> David mentioned in his introduction of you that you studied at Hebrew university. As the president of a pro 80 Israel organization on campus, I'm approached by student interested in studying abroad in Israel because of the security department and State Department's travel warning in the region, that isn't allowed. if I was curious what you recommend and how -- what that communicates to the administration about that? >> sure. I studied, in the introduction at the Hebrew university. I did over a year studying there It was one of the most interesting and mind expanding and culturally opening experiences of my life. I would encourage everybody 81 here to study abrad at some ., it's Israel or wherever. The idea that the administration here would not respect that the credits from a university of Israel just because there's a travel advisory against -- travel advisory recommending against Americans visiting Israel, the fact the administration not only won't respect credits but won't provide the funding and the various programs that are available to students here or available to students here who want to study elsewhere in the world, would be akin to an American citizen being stripped of his or her citizenship or stripped of his or her Social Security benefits or 82 stripped of his or her, you know, basic rights upon returning to the United States if he or she respectfully didn't abide by an advisor. It's an advisor advising you against travel to Israel. It's not banning you from travel to Israel. The United States government didn't ban travel to Israel and then someone went to Israel,-if they banned travel and someone went, you could understand harsh actions being taken. If the United States banned travel to Israel and a student wanted to study, you can returning back to an institution like the University of Florida, you 83 can understand there would be a problem the idea there is an advisory suggesting now is not a good time to travel to Israel and a student says it's important enough to me, the education experience is important enough to me and I'm going to take that risk and go. The idea this institution would not respect the credits and provide the program is a little harsh and actually, completely, it makes virtually no sense to me I'm just -- I'll never forget a moment in Iraq, probably the fall of '0 3, I went with ambassador brem tore meet with a group of -- brem tore meet with a group of -- Bremer To meet with a group of professors. 84 he said, what's the one thing I can do to study and educate and learn and teach Iraqis. They said give us the freedom to travel. Under Saddam, none of academics could travel around the world. If an Iraqui professor wanted to attend an academic conference somewhere else in the world, they would have to submit an application to the head of their department, submit the application, to the head of faculty, to the president of the university, then go to the ministry of higher education and go right up to the senior levels of the government and then come all the way back to the 85 ministry of higher education, to the president of the university, head of the faculty, back to the professor. By the time they got the information back, the application back, they'd always miss the conference. It was designed that way. They basically didn't want people to have access to information and wouldn't let these academics travel. I'm not implying here the goal of the University of Florida's decision here is to prevent students from having access to Hebrew universities or wherever they're studying, but I think the terrorist this is same. You shield people from the opportunity to have these 86 experiences, whatever risks they may incur in the process, physical risks they may incur, it's a dangerous road to go on. A ban on travel is one thing. U.S. government doesn't ban, they advise them not to go. Every person should be able to study it and make an independent decision and take the risk if they want and be welcome back and even more well-rounded student for having gone through that experience and returning to the program. >> hi. When you look at the situation in Iraq today and also in Iraq over the past couple of years, people 87 realize it would be a big mistake to withdraw our troops prematurely from Iraq. What situation do you think has to present itself in order for United States troops to return? >> it's a tough question. I think we'll be there for some time. Not necessarily with the same footprint we have now. I think it will look much different and be much smaller. I talked about checkpoints. The other thing when I was there on my most recent trip, a senior official from the Department of Defense told us starting soon, only Iraqui security forces will be doing the military protocol driving 88 around the country with some exceptions. By and large Iraqis will only see their fellow citizens in uniform patrolling the streets, much like the checkpoints which has a certain psychological effect and humiliation with regard to occupation. That means our troops will be there but in the ground, at bases to play a reinforcement role. Iraqui security forces will play force and we'll be reinforcement when things get dicey. The goal is the Iraqis single-handedly handle the terrorist threats and defend their borders against foreign threats. They're not there yet. 89 That's the benchmark. If the Iraqui security forces defend their country internally and externally, our job will be done. We're not there yet. It will take a lot of time. >> thanks so much for coming to speak with us tonight. My question, you were talking a little bit about the fact we see so many more positive developments and positive developments today in the Arab world and we see negative developments, as you see the coalition of opposition between Iran and Syria currently and you talked about the fact Iraqis felt humiliated instead of maybe more thankful towards the 90 American troops as they were coming in. My question is, what do you feel the change has been and image of the United States since the Iraq war and what do you think the image of the United States currently is now? >> I think -- I think our image was bad before the war. And I think our image is bad now, and I don't think we should have a strategy of trying to make the world love us The world may not like us. That's okay, as long as we're not blowing up our builds in downtown Manhattan. The French don't have a terribly high public opinion of us. 91 They're not trying to kill us. We have respectable debates like democracies have with one another. Our goal should not -- these TV campaigns that try to sell America to the Arab world, like we're a brand of toothpaste or Coca-Cola, getting everybody to enjoy a can of Coke, enjoy a can of America, to me, is crazy. The world may not like us. They may not love everything we do or like everything we represent. That's okay Our goal should be to empower moderates in the Arab world and give them a chance to govern and hold their governments accountable. 92 If that process is going on, you won't have people trying to kill us You may not have people saying nice things about us. I don't care if they say nice things about us. The French and Germans don't say nice things about us and they're not trying to kill us Our public diplomacy strategy should be focused on how to empower moderates. If you're a moderate in Morocco and you want to open a newspaper and want to obtain small business financing to go open your newspaper, moderately toned editorially toned Islamic newspaper, most of the sources of financing come 93 from Islamic run banks. you are only given that financing if you agree to have your business agree with them it makes it very difficult for a moderate newspaper to stay true to its mission. A lot of these newspapers never got off the ground. We should be figuring out ways to get financing to those moderates who want to wage their own war of ideas against the extremists. Let's help them out. If they're critical of us in the process, so be it That's okay. Someone you may have heard of, a Lebanese leader in Beirut, he was extremely critical of America for going into Iraq. He now acknowledges going 94 into Iraq could potentially have the most positive impact in the Arab world because of the things I'm talking about, building a democracy and the ripple effect it could have from the region than anything in the last 50 or 100 years. He's still critical of America but he has an appreciation for the work we're doing there and impact it can have. We need to focus on empowering them even if they criticize us from time-to-time, as long as they're playing a con trucktive role in their society. >> On that note, on the -- I'd like to talk about the problems with in Syria and Lebanon. 95 I'd like to know what you think -- what the American response should be regarding a stalemate between Syria and Lebanon, Syria makes half measures, where it looks like they will go to the Macau valley and Lebanese backed government that takes over the power vacuum and Syria doesn't comply with demands. What do you think the American response should be, and in addition, if Syria does withdraw from Lebanon, what impact do you think that may have on Hezbollah and Iran? >> I think let me answer your last question first. I think if Syria withdraws from Lebanon on international pressure the 96 most immediate effect is the regime in Damascus. That represents power and strength. Syria's power and occupation in Lebanon is as much about Assad's power in the area and the region as anything else. If Assad has to withdraw his troops under international pressure it will make him look very weak in the eyes of his own citizens. I predict and did earlier tonight at dinner, if he has to withdraw his troops under international pressure his regime will fall quickly. He will look weak in the eyes of his citizens and I think they will start to challenge him. 97 it is very important, to the other part of your question, if he does withdraw, we need to think strategically how not to allow Iran or Hezbollah fill the vacuum. I think Hezbollah has its own challenges. If you look at the protest yesterday which I thought was very interesting, those of you that saw 500, 000 Lebanese protested against America and in favor of Syria there was a new nuance. One, they never called for the reinstatement of the government that just fell in Lebanon, the pro-syria government. Two, the flags they're waving, Lebanese flags Hezbollah has their own 98 flag they weren't waving. These are all signals they recognize there's momentum with the opposition in Lebanon. They want to straddle the fence. they want to be moderately pro-syria because Syria financed them and helped give birth to Hezbollah. on the other hand they don't want to be on the wrong side of his strained have the rest of Lebanon calling for a national cause and Hezbollah missing the boat. Thick that's an important sign. generally speaking, I think the message the administration needs to send here is this same message they're sending on 99 Iran, which is Syria better take the action we're suggesting or all options are on the table and leave it at that. We shouldn't get more specific or more bellicose, at least not now. The Syrians need to know we're going to stand with the Lebanese with these this and all options are on the table. >> first, I want to thank you for coming again and thank you in advance for answering my question. >> Don't thank me yet, I have to hear the question. >> My question's a little bit different than what everybody's asking. As somebody who's thinking about joining the diplomatic core and I think 100 maybe somebody else here who might be thinking about the same, what region of the world would you recommend we request? Do you think the Middle East would be some place where the U.S. diplomatic core have the most impact or some place in Africa or seeing Asia's growth, would you recommend that? >> Look, it depends where your personal passions lie. My personal passion is the Middle East. If I were in your shoes, I'd love to be in your shoes, actually. My future is behind me. If I were in your shoes, I would -- I would join the diplomatic core and I would study Arabic and try to be fluent in Arabic and go do 101 tours in the Middle East. To me, that's the most interesting part of the world right now Poses the biggest challenges and where we have the biggest deficit we have the fewest resources and don't have the requisite language skills to engage and be committed to that part of the world. The other part of the world that will pose enormous issues and challenges both good and bad for America is china over the next couple of decades. That would be the other place I would be interested in. My first choice would probably be the Arab world and critical to get proficient in Arabic. 102 I think it's level five or six, according to the State Department ledger, and then go engage them. >> two more questions. >> I'd like to ask a two part question, if you don't mind. >> Firstoff, 20, 30 years ago, it was thought in this country Israel would be a catalyst for democracy in the Middle East. It was thought, at least they may not like the Israelis but they might like the government. >> you mean like they may not like the Israelis but -- >> Might like their form of government. >> Right. Part of the problem why 103 that didn't work out is Israel's seen as too much of a proxy of the U.S. I'd just like to ask why Iraq won't be seen as that? the second part of my question is, obviously, you think that Iraq and china and democracy there is good for the region as a whole. In 19 53, Iran, it was seen as a good idea as well. It took 26 years to figure out that probably wasn't the brightest idea. Every time we intervene in the Middle East, it's like a go-fer game in the ark a kid, you whack one and two pop up. Isn't the problem more constant intervention in trying to maneuver countries, like chess pieces instead of working 104 with them one-on-one and the solution could perhaps be instead of trying to maneuver these countries, to acknowledge and accept our role in establishing and supporting the regime and the Saudi regime in Saudi Arabia, instead of invading, like we have? >> You're suggesting our policy should be to work with those regimes? >> That's the way it's been for ever since we started becoming involved in that region. Saddam wasn't as powerful as he was because of us. -- Saddam was as powerful as he was because of us. >> you're saying that's a good thing? >> I don't think that's a good thing. 105 I think ignoring our part in the power they have is not part of the solution. Earlier on in your speech, you refer to these regimes as very troublesome, as despot tick and you're very correct in saying that. ignoring our part in that is not part of the solution. I want to hear your comment. >> your first ., I don't -- if I'm understanding the history, I don't remember anyone seriously thinking a Jewish democracy would be a model for Arab governance. I don't think Arabs looking at the Israels would result in them saying this could be us some day. I think Arabs looking at an 106 Arab democracy, saying, okay, the Iraqis, the Muslims, they look like us, they sound like us, they talk like us, are building a democracy, why can't we? I don't think they'd ever see European Ozzie Jews in Jerusalem and I fiing it. Seriously. On your second question, I agree we have intervened in that part of the world over the last 50 years. In very detrimental ways. We have empowered a lot of bad people. I think what makes the invasion of Iraq unique is it's the first time, to my knowledge, correct me if I'm wrong, the first time in American history we have toppled the regime and re placed it with a system 107 where the locals can decide what their government is rather than us. The example you cited we got rid of one regime, re placed it with another one and left, how we tended to do business in that part of the world. It's a not surprising much of that part of the world it has us. We've imposed on them governments that subject the citizens to dreadful lives. Well, now, we've removed a dictator and said, it's up to you. We just appoint ad interim government in Iraq that just got thrown out of office by the Iraqis. Are we intervening or telling the Iraqis they 108 can't do it? Nope The government they just elected will likely be one that wasn't our first choice when we gave over sovereignty to Iraquis. So be it. The first time we've toppled the regime and replaced it not with another regime but a system and outlet for them to decide who their government is. That's what makes Iraq different and that's what I believe could be a model for the region to have effects like wave never been able to have. >> I'm not sure how I can follow that question. Very early on in the re building of Iraq, Paul 109 Bremer made the decision to shut down a newspaper in Baghdad. Some have said that that was his greatest mistake and that was a -- added a huge amount of fuel to the insurgencies in Iraq. Having been there -- >> having been involved in the decision to close it, not just having been there. >> What do you think the effect have that was and should he have done something different? >> I take partial responsibility for the decision. It's not all his fault. I think we were in a very tough situation. You had a newspaper, there were two incidents we shut down a newspaper, one at 110 the beginning of our tour and there the other in April, march of '0 4. I -- you had newspapers that were inciting violence, inciting violence against Iraqis and against America. The first newspaper we closed literally listed -- >> why not shut down the "New York Times." >> let me finish. So this newspaper listed -- that's okay. I'm happy to answer the question. >> Been introduced as sparking debate. >> Can I answer the question. I'm happy to hear a question. >> I sat here like an hour. You said like stories and 111 stuff. >> I'll answer your question in one second. >> Do you have anything other than scare tactics and skeleton stories. Great propaganda. I give you a lot of credit. >> Thank you. >> You do a really good job. Congratulations. >> Thank you. I always enjoy feedback. Particularly when it's spontaneous like that. I will answer his question though, he doesn't want to stick around and hear the answer. 20 to 30 -- the newspaper which I found listed 20 to 30 Iraqis by name that the editor of the newspaper was calling for their death. 112 So it was calling on Iraqis to kill these 20 or 30 people by names. Now, to his question, the "New York Times" listed 20 to 30 people by name-calling on citizens to slaughter these people. You bet the American government no matter who was in control would shut down the newspaper or give them a pretty stern warning. Our media laws in the United States and Australia and U.K. have to strike a bicycle lance between protecting freedom of speech or freedom of press -- have to strike a balance. And also protecting against reckless violence or provocation of violence. 113 Anybody who would use a free press or newspaper to incite violence that would result in the slaughtering of innocence is not a serious newspaper. The government has a responsibility to shut down a vehicle for violent ends. So that was our challenge. there were 200 free newspapers that popped up. Most were fine. We didn't like what they said about America, what they said about democracy these newspapers. we didn't shut them down. The organizations we shut down were those not serious newspapers, weren't ones having serious debates and constructive criticisms, ones calling for the deaths of innocent people. 114 We had a responsibility, our ultimate responsibility in Iraq was to promote and preserve security and allow those newspapers to continue to operate would have run counter. Did it have negative effects and repercussions? Certainly. The decision to close the newspaper in march I believe had effect in sparking Muqtada al-Sadr's uprising. We had to contain imregardless with a bad militia killing Americans and we had to confront him at some time any way. Some . The idea we should with hold shutting down a news organ used to promote violence against innocence 115 either we should we infrafrom doing that because we believe of freedom of the press represents our critics, to our critics, to me, it represents a misunderstanding what it means to promote a free press in a free society. Is that it? [ Applause ] >> All right.